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ABSTRACT
This thesis explored the role of the independent peace movements in the
German Democratic Republic in the early 1980s. It specifically examined three
leaders of these movements: Rainer Eppelmann, Frank Eigenfeld, and Vera
Wollenberger. Their work helped create the much larger dissident actions of 1989 by
increasing the level of ''free space" provided in various Lutheran parishes in East
Germany. This expansion occurred in spite of the formation of the GDR Peace
Council, which the state used in an attempt to quell opposition by politicizing peace.
Their efforts were examined by looking at English translations of GDR Peace Council
works, which often exaggerated their goals, actions, and the level of participation.
The thesis also discussed the role of Ostpolitik and the early 1980s arms race between
the Soviet Union and the United States. The latter was the initial inspiration for the
independent peace movements, even as it demonstrated that the German Democratic
Republic often did not strive for peace, especially when its allies were a factor in state
diplomacy.
The role of the early 1980s independent peace movements has been largely
absent from the historiography of the German Democratic Republic. The activities of
1989 have overshadowed the important precursors, such as the independent peace
movements. Many of the leaders of these movements later became influential figures
in the actions of 1989. The independent peace movements taught them important
skills that they transferred from leading small groups in 1979-1983 to larger groups in
1989. The independent peace movements provided East German citizens with a
public forum where they discussed their concerns and wishes. Their main goals were
peace and the internal reform of the German Democratic Republic.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1989, the German Democratic Republic collapsed after widespread
demonstrations. Prior to these protests, small movements had grown in the early
1980s that laid the groundwork for the large-scale demonstrations of 1989.
Throughout the 1980s in East Germany, three primary issues or causes, peace, human
rights, and the environment, had rallied people together in spite of the constant threat
of Stasi harassment, imprisonment, and possible torture. The earliest of these crusades
were the anti-nuclear peace movements of the early 1980s. These set the precedent for
"free space" within many Lutheran churches and established that a certain level of
dissidence could exist, especially when the protestors took adequate precautions, such
as alerting the Western media to their planned activities, though doing so might
undermine their ultimate goals because the movements would be going outside the
GDR, and the media could also put their own spin on events.
It is necessary to emphasize one crucial detail: the independent peace
movements were plural entities. The majority did not have contact with each other
and due to the level of state control, only limited networking could be established
among them. In addition to this factor, many of the movements started because they
desired reform within the system. For this reason, most did not attempt to contact
other groups because they thought more in terms of local changes. Two new goals,
protection from physical harm and the desire to leave East Germany permanently,
along with one large governmental concession allowing more citizens to emigrate,
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especially in 1984, ultimately led to the demise of the early 1980s peace movements,
but they nevertheless ended up having significant effects on East German citizens and
society.
The first changing objective was the importance of evading torture and
imprisonment. From about 1978 until 1982, most of the protestors either did not
entirely understand or did not care about the large possibility for personal harm. As
arrests and harassment increased, some movements decided to use the publicity
afforded by the Western media to protect themselves from the government. While this
tactic was quite successful, it also meant that the original goal of most movements,
reform from within the country, was lost because external media involvement often
distorted the desires of the protestors. The second change was the desire of many to
emigrate to West Germany. These people often became involved in the peace
movements because they believed that participation in subversive activities could
speed along the process. The potential emigrants were proven correct in their
assumptions when the government changed its emigration allowance in 1984. 1 The
levels were lowered in 1985 and returned to normal in 1987. The damage this
migration did to the peace movements is a subject of controversy among historians
and the former dissidents themselves. In some areas, the higher numbers of emigrants
clearly damaged the movements, while in other areas there was little effect. Their

1

Numbers of emigrants from the German Democratic Republic in 1983: 11,343; 1984: 40,974; 1985:
24,912; 1986: 26,178; 1987: 18,958. Source: Dirk Philipse� We Were the People: Voices From East
Germany's Revolutionary Autumn of 1989 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1993), 48.
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strength in numbers no longer existed, and the government used this opportunity to
create an official governmental peace movement, which began in 1983.
This official German Democratic Peace Movement really took off in 1983 as
the government siphoned off members of the independent peace movements. The
government's peace movement used many of the same tactics as the independent
movements, such as peace marches, rallies, and concerts, but governmental control
was guaranteed by Stasi infiltration and mobilization of party faithful to participate.
By taking over the cause of peace and calling for the end of nuclear weapons, the
government managed to circumvent the independent peace movements. Anti
nuclearization and peace became linked as issues advocated by the East German state,
much like workers' rights. For this reason, the causes could no longer be used to
demonstrate discontent with the East German government's policies and actions.
In spite of their importance, East Gennany's peace movements in the early
1980s are largely missing in German historiography. The topic may warrant a few
lines or perhaps a paragraph in works discussing German history, German peace
movements, and actions leading to the collapse of the German Democratic Republic.
Typically, the peace movements in the Federal Republic of Germany, social
movements in the late 1960s throughout the Western world, and the late 1980s
protests in East Germany, have contributed to overshadowing these important events.
In spite of this current obscurity, East German peace movements were clearly
important in the history of social movements in the country. If pockets of protest for
peace were to be built and maintained, there had to be a meeting place. Many
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Lutheran churches in East Germany provided this "free space. "2 This was because the
Lutheran church's relationship with the East German government had been
transformed several years previously, on March 6, 1978.3 On this date, leaders of the
Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, or the Kirchenbund, which contained
exclusively Lutheran preachers, met with Erich Honecker, leader of the German
Democratic Republic, to discuss the future of the Lutheran church within East
Germany. Prior to this meeting, the Lutheran church had encountered a variety of
moods from the state: toleration, sporadic anti-religion campaigns in the late 1940s,
and strong dislike by the government under Ulbricht from 1958 until 1971. When
Honecker came to power in 1971, church-state relations worsened until 1973 when the
state granted limited concessions to Lutheran churches after "its acceptance as a full
voting member of the United Nations" possibly due to the role of the Lutheran
churches "in gaining international recognition for the GDR.',4 Because of increased
state support, the Lutheran church began to portray itself as a "church within
socialism." 5 This gradual return to toleration slowly led to rapprochement with
Honecker at the March 1978 summit. Robert Goeckel argues in The Lutheran Church
and the East German State that one of the main areas of concession was more freedom

2

John P. Burgess, The East German Church and the End ofCommunism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 40-41.
3
Robert F. Goeckel, The Lutheran Church and the East German State: Political Conflict and Change
under Ulbricht and Honecker (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 2.
4
Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy ofa Dictatorship: Inside the GDR: 1949-1989 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 107.
5
The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 3.
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of assembly and an emphasis on better treatment for East Gennan citizens "regardless
of worldview and religious confession.,,6
The 1978 accord provided Lutheran churches with increased freedom, but this
was not entirely without a cost to the churches. While the state did not control the
churches externally, the East Gennan government did send Ministry of State Security,
or Stasi, agents to attend and check on certain church meetings. 7 In addition to this
internal review, the state (via the Stasi) used some Lutheran preachers as unofficial
infonners. 8 Even with this new level of rapprochement, outward dissent and protest
were nevertheless not allowed. Infonnal and fonnal meetings were assumed by
participants to always be under surveillance by the Stasi. In spite of such measures,
however, some Lutheran churches became umbrellas for numerous grassroots
organizations.9 There are several reasons for this. One was that the Lutheran church
had traditionally spoken out on issues that it viewed as important, especially with a
biblical foundation, such as peace, nature, or the environment. 10 Another reason was
individual pastors or church members, who had a strong desire to discuss certain
issues, such as peace and the environment. These individuals drove the process of
creating small groups that met in Lutheran churches to speak about such topics. The
most likely reason was the debate among the Lutheran church hierarchy over what it

6

The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 245; 1-3, 241-246.
Barbara Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance in Unified Germany: Stasi informers and their
impact on society (New York: Routledge, 1999), 84-85; see also, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 109-115.
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8

Narratives of Guilt and Compliance in Unified Germany, 15-84; see also, Karen Dawisha, Eastern
Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 147-148.
9
The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 253.
10
The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 251-252.
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meant to be a "church within socialism. "11 Many pastors believed that Lutheran
churches had a duty to promote Christian ideals or causes, such as peace, even in a
country with a dictatorial regime in power. The early grassroots movements focused
on the environment in the 1970s and anti-nuclear disarmament and peace during the
early 1980s.12
The level of participation by church officials in these movements is still
debated. Some, such as Robert Goeckel, believe that the Lutheran church became a
tool for networking and information gathering among these grassroots groups. 13
Others, like Frank Eigenfeld, a member of the Halle peace movement, argue that
church leaders did not aid the movements, except by providing meeting spaces.14 The
reality of the situation appears to be somewhere in between the assertions of these two
camps of interpretation. Certain parishes, specifically those in Berlin, appear to have
networked within the city and at times also in other areas. In the same period, other
parishes, such as those in Halle, did not know about other peace movements until as
late as 1980 and did not begin networking until 1983. 15 Church leaders' acceptance of
these groups varied from parish to parish. There was no one cohesive independent
peace movement, but instead numerous organizations throughout East Germany.
Pastors led some movements, while others merely used church facilities as a meeting
spot because of governmental tolerance. In every case, the level of surveillance was

11

The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 251.
12 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 253.
13
The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 253.
14
We Were the People, 55.
15 We Were the People, 43, 46.
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unknown until members were arrested or tortured. In some cases, while Stasi
informers were present, the agency decided the activities did not warrant intervention.
Opinions also vary about the number of church informers who reported to the
Stasi. Goeckel is very vague in his assessment of the situation. He states that '1he
church functioned to channel rising grassroots dissent on this [the independent peace
movement] issue, thereby proving useful to a conservative regime interested in
political stability without sacrificing ideological purity or loyalty to the USSR." 16
Goeckel does not explain how the Church provided information about opposition
groups except for stating that subcommittees of the Kirchenbund worked with the state
to deal with such issues. 17 He does not argue that church officials acted as unofficial
informants for the Stasi. Goeckel also goes against most in arguing that the
independent peace movement was a singular entity. Even with such apparent
oversights, Goeckel provides a detailed account of the political situation that existed
between the Kirchenbund and the East German government.
Even aside from the Lutheran church's participatio°' certain other persuasive
reasons existed for the creation of independent peace groups that turned into social
movements in a dictatorial state. This leads to the question of what causes a social
movement. Theories on the causes of social movements are extremely varied. As
Alice Holmes Cooper discusses in Paradoxes ofPeace, there are three primary
arguments that must be examined when thinking about peace movements. The first,
which is largely connected to Ronald lnglehart's scholarship, is the ''value change

16
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The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 255.
The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 256.
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school." 18 This school "holds that value shifts take place across generations
independently of their conscious experience." 19 In lnglehart's model, there are two
primary categories, "materialist" and "postmaterialist." A materialist values tangible
forms of security while a postmaterialist prizes "social, aesthetic, and intellectual
gratification."20 Using West Germany as an example for lnglehart's theory, one
would suppose that a materialist would have lived through the scarcity of the end of
World War II and the immediate postwar period, whereas a postmaterialist would have
been born or grown up during the economic boom of the 1950s. Inglehart's theory
largely fits the account of West Germany's protest movements in 1968 and later, as
well as other forms of activism in western countries. Youths who were raised during
uncommon economic prosperity did not have to worry about the existence or
availability of basic material goods. For this reason, they focused on non-material
ideas and causes. This argument stated that these postmaterialists had the time and
energy to worry about higher ideals, and this led to increases in social activism.
A second school was largely created from the theories of the German social
philosopher Jurgen Habermas, who viewed "social movements as symptomatic of a
crisis of modernity."21 Habermas argued that social movements arise in reaction to

Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes ofPeace: German Peace Movements since 1945 (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1996), 6.
The work of Alice Holmes Cooper provided the information about the three primary social theories that
were extremely helpful in analyzing the independent peace movements of the German Democratic
Republic. While Holmes Cooper's work focuses strictly on the peace movements in the Federal
Republic of Germany from the 1950s until the 1980s, her explanation of social theories was an
invaluable tool in the analysis of the peace movements in the German Democratic Republic.
19
Paradoxes ofPeace, 6.
20
Paradoxes ofPeace, 6.
21
Paradoxes ofPeace, 8.
18

9
new effects on peoples' lives emanating from advanced capitalism.22 Specifically,
such movements arise when a new technological threat to society emerged.23 This
school contended that such a crisis existed in the 1 970s, pointing to nuclear weapons
and pollution as threatening "the physical foundations of life, while destruction of
traditional social settings undermined sources of meaning. "24 According to this
school, the inability of the current political system to deal with such issues led people
to discern a crisis. Those who recognized this state of affairs created or joined social
movements in response.25 Thus, Habermas' followers did not confine social activism
to a particular generation but instead to a group that saw a crisis and shifted their
values and actions in reaction to it.
While the schools of Inglehart and Habermas sought a macro-level explanation
of social movements in the 1 960s and later, others used micro-level or individual
analysis to explain participation. Such examinations classified causes "ranging from
cost-benefit analyses and the draw of group solidarity to feelings of personal efficacy
and belief in group success."26 This third form of inquiry used individual responses to
reconstruct groups by combining people who acted for similar reasons. Instead of one
generation or "crisis-reacting" group, the individual analyses emphasized numerous
theoretical groups whose only connection could be as limited as their belief that a
particular movement could succeed in its goals, so they decided to participate in it.
22

Paradoxes ofPeace, 8.
Paradoxes ofPeace, 9.
24
Paradoxes ofPeace, 9.
25
Paradoxes ofPeace, 9.
26
Paradoxes ofPeace, 28 1 .
23
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Numerous reasons existed for the creation and participation in social movements. The
next chapter will examine a few of the primary reasons of those who joined such
movements through case studies.
These case studies, which make up Chapter 2, examine three important
individuals, Rainer Eppelmann, Frank Eigenfeld, and Vera Wollenberger, in the
various independent peace movements. Each of these people participated in and
helped lead certain peace movements of the early 1980s. They all also encouraged,
organized, and influenced the movements for reform that later occurred in 1988 and
1989 in the German Democratic Republic. Their reasons for participating varied,
though they each believed that the socialist system could be and needed to be changed.
While the sources concerning their activism differed for the three, much of the
information on Eppelmann and Eigenfeld came from interviews recorded by historian
Dirk Philipsen. Numerous other secondary and primary sources were consulted to
ensure that the accounts of the events discussed in the interviews were historically
accurate. For Eppelmann, a letter he wrote to Erich Honecker, the leader of East
Germany from 1971 until 1973, also provides specific evidence about his reasons for
helping create an independent peace movement as well as the goals he hoped to
accomplish through this group. Vera Wollenberger' s autobiography, which
illuminated her participation in opposition movements and the eventual discovery that
her husband had been a Stasi informer, provided most of the information for the third
case study. Ag� other primary and secondary sources were examined to corroborate
this material.
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In addition to examining and analyzing case studies of the independent peace
movements, the East German government's peace movement will also be explored in
Chapter 3. The German Democratic Republic created the GDR Peace Council when
the country was formed in 1949. This Council was only active until 1952. While the
state's rhetoric at times included the goal of peace, no specific government-sponsored
organization attempted to actively pursue the completion of such a large task. The
emergence of independent peace movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s created
problems for the East German government. While East German leaders (at times)
claimed to want peace, their foreign policy did not always reflect such a goal. This
was particularly evident during the intermediate nuclear force (INF) controversy,
which debated the number of intermediate nuclear weapons the United States could
have in Western Europe and the number that the Soviet Union could have within the
Eastern Bloc, which lasted from 1979 until 1983. The independent peace movements
focused on such contradictions in the state's rhetoric. In doing so, these groups
created active dissent that could not easily be quelled because the government
supposedly supported all activities that led toward a greater level of peace in the
world.
For this reason, the German Democratic Republic revived the GDR Peace
Council in 1983. From 1983 until 1986, the Council organized and sponsored
numerous activities to get East German citizens involved in the peace campaign. At
times, the GDR Peace Council used tactics, such as marches and rallies, which the
independent peace movements had originally utilized. The state wanted to replace the
inherent dissent within the independent peace movements by taking over the issue of
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peace as a cause that was strongly advocated by the East German government. While
numerous German sources verify the tactics taken by the state to accomplish this,
there are also several English sources that demonstrate that the German Democratic
Republic wanted to show those in the Western, capitalist world that it was fighting for
peace. These sources advertise the activities of the East German state's peace
movement while also pointing out the virtuous activities of the German Democratic
Republic and the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace.
These two very different types of peace movements demonstrate the creation
and quelling of dissent within the German Democratic Republic. Prior to the early
1980s (with the exception of the 1953 Uprising), the East German state had not been
actively opposed by such numbers of its own citizens. Their response could not be
overly harsh because these independent peace groups were usually contained and often
protected by the Lutheran Church, which had been a largely (but not always respected)
guaranteed "free space" in East Germany since the mid-1970s. For this reason and the
political issues, spec'ifically the Soviet Union placing more intermediate range nuclear
weapons in East Germany in 1981 and 1982, involved in the INF debate, the state
could not repress the independent peace movements, as they would have done at any
previous time. Instead the German Democratic Republic had to wait until the INF
controversy had concluded before it could take up the cause of peace as its own, as
discussed below in Chapter 4.
The peace movements from 1979 until 1986 have rarely been discussed in the
historiography that seeks to explain why the German Democratic Republic collapsed
in 1989. Since the Berlin Wall fell, the episodes of 1988 and 1989 have been
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thoroughly detailed. While 1989 was a watershed event, there were many prior
actions that led to the success of 1989. The independent peace movements from 1979
until 1983 created a grassroots level of dissent for the first time in the state's history.
These movements also taught organizational and leadership skills to many individuals
who would use them again in 1989. The activities of the independent peace
movements provided many of the tools, as well as the realization that opposition was
possible, that made 1989 such a watershed event for the late twentieth century.

15
Chapter 2
Case Studies of Independent Peace Movements

In We Were the People: Voices From East Germany 's Revolutionary Autumn
of 1989, Dirk Philipsen argues against the idea that "the events of 1989 were somehow
a product of a 'spontaneous' rising."27 While 1989 has received the majority of
historians' attention in the last decade, the events leading to the German Democratic
Republic's collapse did not happen overnight. The idea of a spontaneous revolution is
an interesting theory, but it is incorrect. The following chapter discusses key leaders
and groups that represent certain categories within the independent peace movements
of the early 1980s prior to the turning point of 1989. These categories include: a
pastor's efforts in Berlin (with almost complete access to Western media broadcasts as
well as contact with Western journalists), a small city group in Halle with Western
media access that grew to an unanticipated degree, and a women's peace movement in
Berlin. The case of the women's peace movement is important because it was the first
women's movement in the German Democratic Republic. These women learned that
they did not merely have to listen at group meetings but they could express their
opinions and even become leaders. All three of these case studies are in regions that
had access to the Western media, yet in each case, the motivations of the individuals
involved were not solely responses to peace movements in West Germany. Instead,
their aims were to increase peace, provide more open forums where citizens could
express their fears, concerns, and opinions, and to reform the state from the inside out.

21

We Were the People, 1 6.
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This information goes against the idea that the East German peace movements were
only copycat events and not the true sentiments of East German citizens.
In numerous interviews with leaders of the 1989 dissident movements,
Philipsen uncovered an important correlation: the majority of these influential
individuals had participated in, if not in fact led, previous protest groups. One of the
best known of these interviewees is Rainer Eppelmann, a Lutheran pastor in East
Berlin during the early 1980s.
Eppelmann represents the epitome of a particular type of East German activist.
He was fairly safe from serious harm because of his position in the church in addition
to his intelligent use of Western media to ensure that he would not just "disappear."
Eppelmann also preached in East Berlin where knowledge of Western activities, such
as peace movements, was prevalent because Western German television transmitted
into East Berlin and much of the GDR. While not a typical Lutheran preacher in any
other time period (given Lutheran traditional deference to political authority at earlier
times in German history), Eppelmann does fit the profile of many East German
preachers who joined the profession because of their radical political tendencies. The
Lutheran church was not entirely protected from the government's authority or the
Stasi, but a career as a pastor permitted one to avoid severe penalties for not following
the Socialist Unity Party's policies.
Eppelmann's life did not begin as that of a typical East German. He attended a
school in West Berlin until the 1961 erection of the Berlin Wall.28 Prior to the

28

Wer war wer - DDR: Ein biographisches Lexi/con (Berlin: Christoph Links, 1992), 103.
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building of the Wall, Eppelmann had not been a pacifist. In fact, he had intended to
become a fighter pilot in the West German army. Because he had attended West
German schools, the government refused to let him take the Abitur, the exam
necessary to attend university.29 Subsequently, Eppelmann worked as a roofer's
apprentice. Then he was drafted into an East German construction brigade for a very
brief stint because he refused to take the military oath that included, "'with a weapon
in my hand. "'30 After eight months in jail for this offense, he served his eighteen
months required service and then returned to a construction apprenticeship. After
completion of this apprenticeship, Eppelmann entered a construction-engineering
program. After only a brief period there, he became a bricklayer because he found the
East German university too close-minded after his liberal, West German education.
As for numerous others in his generation, the 1968 Prague Spring was the turning
point for Eppelmann. He and his sister legibly signed and provided a complete
address in a solidarity declaration book at the Czechoslovakian Embassy. 3 1 Shortly
thereafter, in 1969, Eppelmann began classes at an East Berlin seminary.32 While he
had been confirmed previously in his life and attended services, he had not been
overly religious.33 His decision to become a pastor hinged more on political
convictions than religious beliefs '"because the church was the only place in which
one could breathe in this country. "'34 He served as the pastor of the Samariter Parish

29
30
31

32
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We Were the People, 58. Interview by Philipsen with Rainer Eppelmann.
We Were the People, 60.
We Were the People, 61.
Wer war wer - DDR: Ein biographisches Lexikon, 103.
We Were the People, 62.
We Were the People, 56.
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in East Berlin as well as the district youth pastor for East Berlin's Friedrichshain
borough. 3 5 It is in these capacities that his dissident tendencies grew. His most novel
actions were the creation of "Blues Masses" in the late 1970s, writing letters to leaders
of the German Democratic Republic, and co-authoring a call for a ''peace without
arms" in 1982 with Robert Havemann.
Eppelmann turned into an acknowledged revolutionary within the church
almost immediately. He departed from the traditional use of a biblical theme as the
focus of youth masses. Instead, Eppelmann decided to ask youths in attendance about
concerns in their lives. As he remembered, "The topics that came up had to do with
hopelessness, feeling incarcerated, fear, fear of the police, fear of the Stasi, fear of
superiors-all these were topics that we tried to pick up on, even during public
events."36 This form of "outside the box thinking" epitomized Eppelmann's actions as
a pastor. He was one of the first to provide a public forum for expressing political
opinions. This was extremely uncommon because "citizens of the GDR only
expressed what they really thought among circles of close friends, the family, or at the
neighborhood bar after they got drunk-but never publicly. "37 Eppelmann continually
pushed the envelope.
After being asked by a young man to allow blues concerts in the church around
1980, Eppelmann suggested a few improvements to this idea and in doing so created
the "Blues Masses."38 Blues were popular throughout East Germany as well as West
5
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Germany because of the infiltration of American music after World War II. The view
of blues music that was held by the GDR state was that this type of American music
was something that only those opposed to the government or degenerates would listen
to. Eppelmann described the "Blues Masses" as starting
with biblical texts about love, then [the young man] played a few blues songs,
then we read a few texts, and so on, and 200 people showed up, for heaven's
sake. For a normal church service in downtown Berlin you would never have
gotten together 200 people. The next time we chose our own theme, wrote our
own texts while still using some biblical texts, and then 400 people showed up.
This kept on growing-growing so much, in fact that people began to come
from all over the country, with backpacks on their shoulders, lining up in front
of the church because they were worried they wouldn't be able to get in.
During peak times-that must have been in the early '80s-10,000 people
showed up. We had to repeat some services three to five times. 39
This description explains a lot about the independent peace movements in the German
Democratic Republic in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some aspects justify detailed
explanation. These movements were often held in churches where the government
tolerated a level of "free space" as a safety valve. The utilization of church rooms as
meeting places did not mean that those attending were necessarily Christian believers.
This is worth emphasizing. Likewise, Eppelmann' s case also demonstrates that not all
. East German Lutheran pastors chose the profession solely because of their religious
convictions. Many actions at this time were driven by political necessity or on an
even more simplistic level, the need for a free civic space, a place where opinions
against governmental policies could be voiced. The government's tolerance of the
Lutheran church, especially after the 1978 agreement, meant that Lutheran churches
became forums where dissent could be voiced. It will become clear in later examples
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that the church did not tolerate every group and certain churches were more strictly
controlled by the Lutheran church leadership than Eppelmann's. Also, the levels of
Stasi surveillance and infiltration, not only into groups but also within the church
hierarchy, varied from city to city. Eppelmann' s "Blues Masses" should be viewed as
atypical, though the level of support he received from the church hierarchy was not.
This institutional fact should be kept in mind: behind each parish that allowed
independent peace groups to meet, there were church leaders who allowed the
incidents and often protected the participants. In rare cases, church officials were
unofficial informers for the Stasi, but the majority in the hierarchy were well
intentioned.
However, the Stasi did have an impact on Eppelmann's life. The "Blues
Masses" were highly controversial and for that reason Eppelmann and the participants
were watched and at times punished. As the "Blues Masses" became larger events,
the Stasi, local police, and the East Berlin mayor all confronted Eppelmann, ordering
that he stop holding these services. 40 In spite of these problems, the church hierarchy
stood behind him though they also told him, "Eppelmann, you're putting the fate of
,
the entire church at risk with your activities.' 4 1 He told Philipsen that these events
were difficult for him, but Eppelmann believed that he nevertheless had to sponsor
these services. Throughout his story, Eppelmann emphasized the overriding
importance of a free civic sphere. His actions reinforced this idea. He believed that
too many citizens were suffering not from a lack of voice (though it was definitely a
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problem), but more importantly citizens did not know if they were the only ones who
were feeling so much fear and were detached from each other as a consequence.
Eppelmann appears to have truly wanted to help these people. In order to do so, he
felt that he had to lead them. Eppelmann did this not only by backing the "Blues
Masses" but also through letters (some of which were given in advance to the Western
media) to top government officials asking for change in the German Democratic
Republic.
An example of such a letter is one that Rainer Eppelmann wrote to Erich
Honecker on September 24, 1981. In this letter, Eppelmann requested political
changes, especially in relation to issues of peace. He began the letter by stating "It is
five minutes before noon. ,,42 Eppelmann stated that the threat of a nuclear war was as
high as ever in 1981. He told Honecker that many resources, including human labor
and East German money, had been irresponsibly used. Eppelmann argued that
increases in nuclear weapons only led to higher levels of "fear, mistrust, hate,
aggression, and resignation" between countries.43 He told Honecker that peace was
the only solution because it builds trust and confidence between people and nations,
which is impossible to do when the threat of nuclear destruction looms so close.
Eppelmann believed that peace was the only solution to confronting the possibility of
nuclear destruction. He continued to explain to Honecker why he should make
increasing efforts toward peace with Western countries.44
Wolfgang Btlscher, Peter Wensierski, and Klaus Wolschner, eds., Friedensbewegung in der DDR:
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Eppelmann believed that the military was beyond the realm of control by East
German citizens, even though the civilians would be destroyed if nuclear war
occurred. Civilian interests were not being taken into account, and citizens wanted
them to be, especially those who were Christians and pacifists because they were the
primary leaders of the independent peace movements. Eppelmann wanted Honecker
to support specific measures that could achieve peace for the numerous East German
citizens who desired it. Instead of ordering Western European countries to disarm and
giving NATO rules for disarmament, Eppelmann believed Honecker must first build
trust between East Germany and Western Europe. He even provided Honecker with
specific proposals for procedures that would lead to increased trust.45
The letter contained sixteen ideas that Eppelmann believed must be followed to
create peace in Europe. First, he wanted to ban the production, sale, and importation
of all war toys. Second, Eppelmann believed that soldiers must not be glorified in
schoolbooks or in homework materials. Third, he wanted "organized visits of the
kindergarten groups and school classes" to the barracks to end. 46 Fourth, Eppelmann
believed that student and worker military training as well as studying the history of the
army must be ended. Fifth, he deemed it necessary to teach students methods of
peaceful conflict resolution in their families and in their work, and he also asserted
that students needed to learn environmental conservation techniques in addition to
taking an introduction to psychology class. Eppelmann wanted "financial and
occupational preferential treatment" ended for youths who decided to make military
45
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service their career. 47 He also wanted Honecker to stop discrimination against youths
who decided not to make the military their career. Eppelmann also believed that
alternatives to military service, such as a form of community service, should be
created and given an equal opportunity. Because of his background in the
construction division of the army, Eppelmann also asked that "the occupational
discrimination for conscripts allowed to do non-military (esp. building) work" end. 48
The other large changes that Eppelmann believed necessary were ending
discrimination of students devoted to pacifism, East Germany publicly declaring that
the country is leading the way "for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe," requesting
that all European countries follow this example, and a public declaration that the
German Democratic Republic would gradually disarm.49 Eppelmann stated that these
measures were necessary because otherwise, he declared, only "five minutes"
remained before nuclear war would break out and all of Europe would be destroyed.
Eppelmann concluded that for this reason, East Germany must risk something in order
to create peace. He even signed the startling letter "yours faithfully, Rainer
Eppelmann."50
As this letter demonstrates, Eppelmann did not want to destroy the German
Democratic Republic completely; he wanted to reform it. As he explained, "What we
were trying to do was to turn East Germany into something else, into a society that
would seem attractive to us, that would seem humane to us, a society in which it
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would be fun to live, in which one would be able to fulfill oneself."5 1 In this way,
Eppelmann fits into Inglehart's "value change school" as a "postmaterialist." He did

not have to worry about the material goods necessary for daily life. For this reason, he
had more time to focus on the ideas of change that East German citizens had and
movements that would attempt to get them to that point. In addition to being a
"postmaterialist," Eppelmann was also someone affected by the "crises of modernity."
The causes of his dislike for the current society derived from what it had become as
opposed to what it once was or could be. Eppelmann's life did not completely change
when he decided to support the Prague Spring participants in 1968, but his ideals did
begin to come to the forefront of his mind and they demanded action. He could have
continued to make a good living as a bricklayer, but he would not have been able to
speak his mind. For Eppelmann, the increasing forced militarization in schools and
workplaces was something he saw as unnecessary and harmful. While he was not
initially a pacifist, Eppelmann did view increased state control in all areas of life as
overbearing. There was no public sphere, not even a true private sphere. Even if the
German Democratic Republic did not maintain constant surveillance of every single
person through the Stasi, each person suspected and feared that he or she was being
watched in such a way. This fear was, not only for Eppelmann but also more
importantly for those in his congregation, another of his perceived crises of modernity.
The final crisis was the increased level of Soviet nuclear weapons in East Germany.
Because Eppelmann was a leader, he did not really fit into the micro-level analysis for
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group participation. He encouraged others to join because of his belief in the various
causes. Each individual who attended the "Blues Masses" and other activities had to
decide what his or her reasons were, but Eppelmann initiated and perpetuated the
various causes, demanding confrontation, but not controlling action.
Other independent peace movements existed, though most did not know of the
large gatherings in East Berlin in detail. One such movement formed in Halle in 1978
after a local pastor formed an "open group" calling itself "Open Work." Frank
Eigenfeld, a biologist by trade as well as a founding member of the largest
oppositional group in the late 1980s, New Forum, and his wife joined. At "Open
Work," members discussed various problems in their lives and tried to find possible
solutions. One area that they continued to return to was the issue of increasing nuclear
weapons deployed in East Germany. Eigenfeld and his wife were among the few
older members of "Open Work." The majority of the members were younger, though
all appear to have worked together to develop plans of action across generational
lines. 52
"Open Work" wanted to draw attention to the problems of larger numbers of
nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic. To accomplish this, the group
decided to conduct small demonstrations. These were largely successful because no
one in the government expected such actions. Eigenfeld's description of their first
demonstration seems almost surreal. During an official East German "peace meeting"
in 1981, the group marched alongside the "blueshirts," the party-operated Free
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German Youth (FDJ). Members of "Open Work" continued to march in the "Make
Peace Against NATO Weapons" state meeting even though they also opposed Soviet
nuclear missiles that were to be stationed throughout East Germany. "Open Work"
made it all the way to the grandstand, which contained the district party leaders. At
that point, the independent group of about eighty people began singing songs to gain
attention from the leaders and the crowd. They briefly achieved this before being
drowned out by the "blueshirts" yelling "' long live the party. "'53 This first event was
successful in gaining attention, even if only briefly, for their cause. Various "forms of
repression, summonses, and such" limited future success. Eigenfeld pointed out that
the first event was the only one free of oppressive measures. At the 1981 "Make
Peace Against NATO Weapons" march, the government merely photographed them. 54
In spite of the government's efforts to contain the Halle group, they soon
conducted other demonstrations and activities. This shows that their actions were not
for limited goals. They desired more than brief governmental attention. The group
desired real change and social impact. Many have suggested that the dissident
movements of the 1980s desired the downfall of the government. Even in these
seemingly extreme cases of opposition, the leaders of these groups did not think in
terms of the destruction of the German Democratic Republic (this perhaps began to
occur closer to 1989). Eigenfeld demonstrated this point when he said that in the early
1980s, his "hopes did not encompass the idea that the existing state had to be
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toppled."55 This idea runs throughout almost every story of East German dissenters.
More than anything, these individuals desired real change in the existing environment.
They were tired of the government's hypocrisy and repression.
While they desired peace, the independent peace movements were also
effective tools for political dissent. The government had a peace agenda as previously
noted, "Make Peace Against NATO Weapons" (Frieden Schaffen und gegen NATO
Waffen). For this reason, the issue of peace was one of the few realms where a small
level of freedom existed for East German citizens. Clearly this was still quite limited
as the crackdown on the "Open Work" group revealed. The cause of peace was also
an area that the Lutheran church supported strongly. This allowed those who desired
change to use churches as meeting places. Only when groups severely deviated from
the issue of peace, narrowly construed, did some church leaders intervene and refuse
to allow meeting space. And this was often only because of increased governmental
controls against various churches. Prior to such suppressio� groups in Halle and other
cities worked to change not only policies and actions with respect to nuclear weapons
but also to change the East German system to allow more freedom for its citizens.
According to Eigenfeld, ''Open Work" was not an overly theoretical organization.

Members felt that "the party pretty much determined people's lives, that nobody had
the opportunity to participate freely in this society, that 'they' always decided
everything." 56 The group wanted to change the German Democratic Republic from a
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repressively controlled government to one that tolerated expression of opinions against
certain policies.
They tried to do this through several methods, specifically targeting the causes
of peace and the environment, topics that had received a fair amount of support from
the Lutheran church in the mid-l 970s (in the two Germanies ). An example of the
level of suppression that Eigenfeld and the others had to endure is exemplified by one
particular environmental demonstration incident (though similar ones occurred with
peace protests). As Eigenfeld explained to Philipsen, "each and every time, [these]
resulted in our short-term arrest, such as an environmental demonstration in which we
wanted to bike to Buna (an extremely polluted industrial center near Halle), with
banners, signs, and petitions, and so on. "57
In addition to these arrests in 1982 and 1983, Eigenfeld and three others
attempted to draft a "petition about the current situation in the GDR," but he and
another member were briefly arrested though not tried for any crime.58 Their defense
attorney was Wolfgang Schnur, who often defended dissidents though he was also-
unknown to his clients-an important Stasi informer. Schnur typically advised his
clients and their families not to go to the Western media. He initially convinced
Eigenfeld of this when Eigenfeld's wife was arrested on August 3 1, 1983, for helping
plan a failed peace demonstration. Two weeks later, Erich Honecker released
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Sebastian Pflugbeil, an East Berlin dissident, after the mayor of West Berlin argued
publicly for his release. 59 Clearly, publicity was effective at times.
This event was a turning point for Eigenfeld. Previously, he had believed that
involving the Western media would be pointless, but this event proved that publicity
was key in protection from long-term imprisonment. Prior to 1983, "Open Work" did
not network with other peace movements. "Open Work" had heard about Eppelmann
and members attended his church in Berlin around 1980. They also tried to establish
initial contacts with him though they were not really successful in doing so in a
significant way until 1982. The members of "Open Work" likely traveled to attend a
"Blues Mass" as so many others throughout East Germany had done. Eigenfeld used
his wife's role in creating a local "Women for Peace" group in Halle to enlist the
support of the much larger, founding Berlin group of"Women for Peace." Eigenfeld
explained that by 1983 "everyone had vague notions about other groups, but until then
we had not attempted to establish any contacts. "60 The emergency situation and
understanding of the importance of publicity led him to drive to Berlin to find help by
searching for Western contacts. Eigenfeld' s use of the Western media resulted in
intervention by the West German Green party who petitioned Honecker for his wife's
release, which occurred the following day.61
From this point on Eigenfeld decided, in a fundamental shift, that the Halle
group "should try [to] use the Western media as a source of security."62 Eigenfeld
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finally understood that if activists "continued to work in isolation and engage in
actions without letting the Western media know about it, no one would find out about
them.,,6J Previously, Eigenfeld and others in the Halle peace movement believed that
they should not tum to the Western media because the issues were internal East
German matters. This demonstrates that the Halle movement continued to believe in
reform from within. They sent petitions to state and party officials and not to the
Western media because they "nurtured the naive hope that some day [they] would
receive a position response through official avenues."64 It took the arrest of
Eigenfeld's wife to force him to realize how ineffective their actions had previously
been. The Halle peace group had held numerous marches and events in the center of
the city, but very few people knew about them and those who did refused to spread the
word. Eigenfeld believes this was because of the Stasi's control and people's fear of
being labeled as dissidents. In this way, the Stasi maintained boundaries for topics of
discussion in East German society. However, information gained through the Western
media was outside of this realm of Stasi control. Since the government tacitly
tolerated East German citizens watching Western television programs, knowledge
gained through such channels could be discussed with others. This realization in
addition to the need for security against almost certain arrests and indefinite
imprisonment led the Halle peace movement to add the use of Western media to their
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operations. They achieved this by twice monthly trips to Berlin to update the media
about their activities.65
For Eigenfeld, the building of the Berlin Wall in 196 1 was his crisis. He
explained, "All of a sudden it became strikingly clear to me that there are certain
people out there who have the power fundamentally to curtail your wishes and your
plans. This was something I wasn't used to from home, and something I was never
able to accept. "66 He viewed constraints as unjust, though he says he and others he
knew felt powerless, especially after the failure of the Prague Spring. Eigenfeld's
turning point came after the 1977-1978 nuclear annaments buildups in East and West
Germany. During this period, he decided that he could no longer watch what
happened but that he should take action and stop being a victim. 67
This transformation demonstrates that Eigenfeld had time to think and worry
about non-material values, which means that he was a "postmaterialist" in terms of
lnglehart' s theories. Eigenfeld fits Habermas' model almost perfectly because he
believed that the environment's destruction and increases in nuclear weapons were
killing the German Democratic Republic. Habermas' model states that those who
believe social movements are created because of a crisis of modernity often use the
example of nuclear weapons and pollution as threatening "the physical foundations of
life, while destruction of traditional social settings undermined sources of meaning. "68
This is exactly what Eigenfeld believed. The only area that does not completely
65
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accord with Habermas' model is the idea of advanced capitalism. While East
Germany was explicitly created with an anti-capitalist system, there was still a crisis
of modernity for Eigenfeld. The state continually infringed on his life and undermined
what he valued, specifically the environment and peace. For these reasons, Eigenfeld
decided that he must participate in social movements against the state. On the micro
level, Eigenfeld not only believed in the ideas of the independent peace movement in
Halle but he also felt that it was necessary for East Germans to be able to voice their
opinions even when they opposed governmental actions. Eigenfeld' s participation
ultimately hinged on his desire to end the German Democratic Republic's repression
of its own citizens.
The experience of Vera Wollenberger has certain important similarities to that
of Eppelmann and Eigenfeld as well as many striking differences. Just as in the cases
of the two men, Wollenberger' s participation in the independent peace movement
began in a church. Like them she eventually came to believe that open, genuine
discussions needed to occur in which all citizens could freely voice their opinions.
Wollenberger also believed that the German Democratic Republic should continue to
exist but that it had to adapt in order to do so. While her views were comparable to
those of Eppelmann and Eigenfeld in these areas, her case differed considerably in
terms of her personal life. Unknown to her prior to East Germany's collapse, her
husband, Knud ("Donald" to the state), was a Stasi informer. Additionally, her case is
significant because Wollenberger provides a female perspective as well as that of a
mother in a peace group.
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Wollenberger' s participation in the independent peace movement was a
gradual process (unlike her husband's unhesitating decision to be a Stasi informer).69
She studied historical materialism at the Academy of Science under Professor
Wolfgang Eichhom.70 Around 1975 she formed a small house circle that met to
discuss science fiction authors Karl-Heinz and Angela Steinmiiller. 71 This group
eventually progressed to examine other issues, and began to work through the history
of modem European philosophy. 72 While Wollenberger did not view their weekly
meetings as practical, she argues that the intellectual exchange the group fostered was
very important to her. 73 This appears to be one of the activities that led Wollenberger
to believe that discussion was necessary in any country. Her house group's meetings
were not direct dissent but they were also not typical.
Beyond this group, Wollenberger, like many others her age, had prior
knowledge of important dissident events in the Eastern Bloc. She had been present
when classmates at her school discussed the Prague Spring of 1968.74 Wollenberger
also knew about a group of students that experienced disciplinary action and party
punishment when its activities in 1971 were deemed by the government to be anti
Soviet and attempting to undermine the strength of the military. 75 She knew the
consequences for such actions, yet she still had great illusions and hopes that change
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could occur.76 These hopes gradually faded the longer she worked at the Academy of
Science.77
Wollenberger's participation in the independent peace movement seems almost
accidental, though her husband's secret work likely unintentionally led to this activity.
It all began when she and her husband attended an event at the old parish in Berlin
Pankow on October 24, 1981.78 The new youth pastor, Ruth Misselwitz, began a
discussion of the theme "Against Death-Security for Peace."79 At the end of the
service, a leaflet came around that explained the creation of a peace circle that those
attending could attend.80 Wollenberger writes that she and Knud entered their names,
and they later received an invitation from Ruth Misselwitz with details for the first
meeting.81 A month later, fifty people gathered in the parish hall on Hadlichstrasse in
the Pankow district.82 Wollenberger became very anxious when she had to introduce
herself to the group though she remembers that Knud was oddly calm.83 It was at this
first meeting where she began to work in an independent peace movement.
After her first month of participation in the group, the peace circle rapidly
became the center of their lives for the next year. For the first time, Wollenberger was
able to overcome her shyness and voice her own opinions to the Pankow peace circle.
In this environment, she was able to freely express her ideas in front of a relatively
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large group, an experience she had never previously had. Wollenberger describes it as
a new intellectual freedom because she could express her views instead of hiding them
as she had done growing up and as an adult. These were not necessarily new thoughts,
but now her ideas developed and evolved for the first time because of the input of the
group. 84
After Wollenberger began to participate in the group, she also assumed a role
as one of the teachers. She and her students often had politically critical discussions in
which she taught them to be mindful of the numerous pro-Marxist mottos that existed.
Only later did Wollenberger participate in critical discussion classes in her work at the
Academy of Science. Wollenberger describes her experience in the Pankow peace
circle as separate from her career. In the circle, she could discuss her opinions while
in her work, she was forced to ignore them. Eventually the Pankow peace circle grew
to include more members of the public, which also increased the risk that sooner or
later repressive measures from the state would descend on them all. Wollenberger
effectively describes the possible actions against an individual determined to be a
dissident. The initial measures would be discrimination in the workplace. This could
then escalate into loss ofjob, and even more severe were travel restrictions, detention,
and possibly (as a last resort) forced deportation out of the German Democratic
Republic. 8 5
The creation of the Pankow peace circle thus came with many risks, though the
greatest of these was not ever knowing if a member was a Stasi informer who could
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turn the whole group into criminals by reporting to East German authorities. 86 While
church rooms were supposed to have a legally safe status, the meetings the Pankow
peace circle held in the parish were not purely Christian meetings. 87 In spite of this
risk, Wollenberger decided to participate iµ the circle. She even commented that after
the first meeting without any incidents, the fear of being reported disappears. 88 While
in retrospect this may appear incredibly naive, it would be almost impossible to live
any kind of life while constantly fearing that the Stasi was going to arrest you. Instead
of focusing on such concerns, Wollenberger and the peace circle grew so much that
she even created a private philosophy circle that studied the environment and later one
that focused exclusively on ecology.89 One perceives here the dynamics of growing
personal and group activity.
For almost all of 1982, the Pankow peace circle worked without being
disturbed. During this time, the "Core Members" developed into fast friends. As
Wollenberger describes the members, most were in their thirties with small children.
For this reason, children played an important role in their group. While they worked
and discussed, their children stayed busy. At one point, the children even took part in
role-playing peaceful actions. In Wollenberger' s min� the amount of participation
that their children were allowed made it possible for the adults to discuss and theorize
as well as play, sing, and dance. In this way, the experience was very different from
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the "fossilized system" of East Germany. The peace circle provided a new way of
living, an alternative model. 90
Because of these reasons, Wollenberger fits into Inglehart's model as a
postmaterialist because she was able to look beyond the issue of security. She realized
the danger that could come with Stasi intervention because of her participation in the
Pankow peace circle, yet she chose to ignore this. In fact, Wollenberger fits the
postmodernist category almost exactly because her desire for intellectual discourse
was so gratifying that it outweighed the associated threat of harassment or detention
by the state.
Wollenberger also fits the theories of Habermas, though only gradually.
Through her participation in the peace circles, she realized what the German
Democratic Republic was missing. While in Habermas' model, those joining social
movements do so with the knowledge and intent of reacting against the failures of the
current system to adapt, it took participation with others before Wollenberger realized
how problem-ridden the state had become. After this realization, she worked to solve
this crisis, which she believed could be accomplished through public discussion that
would lead to changes not only in the government but also in society at large.
On the micro-level, Wollenberger enjoyed participating in the Pankow peace
circle because of the group's unity and camaraderie. Her desire for group success as
well as intellectual fulfillment trumped her fears about reactive measures taken by the
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state. For Wollenberger the cost-benefit analysis always came down on the side of
participation in spite of the risks.
This was also true for Eppelmann and Eigenfeld. All three believed in
reforming the German Democratic Republic, and they felt that this could be done
through the work of the independent peace movements. Most importantly, they
valued the ideal that citizens should have a voice in the state, especially if the
government acted in unjust ways. The independent peace movements provided them
as well as many other citizens with such a voice.
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Chapter 3
Superseding the Independent Peace Movements: the Case of the German
Democratic Republic Peace Council
According to literature written and published by the German Democratic Peace
Council, East Germany was always committed to the cause of peace because of the
lessons learned from World War I and World War II. 9 1 These statements clearly fit
the mission of the GDR Peace Council in the late 1980s but do not seem completely
accurate because the actions of the East German government did not always adhere to
increasing peace. This is particularly evident in the euromissile debate that occurred
from 1979-1983.
Literature written by the GDR Peace Council demonstrates the contradictions
that exist between the rhetoric and the reality of the state's actions. The English
translation of the GDR Peace Council's work, The peace movement in the GDR, and
its distribution to libraries in the United States prior to the collapse of East Germany
also indicates a specifically, carefully targeted audience.92 Throughout the Council's
pronouncements, claims are made that all areas of society are welcome and participate
in the GDR Peace Council's activities.93 One of the most blatant of these assertions
comes on the first page after the introductory comments. It states, "By nature, the
peace movement of the GDR is a democratic mass movement which comprises all
classes and strata of society, people of all ages, different philosophies and religious
Intertext Berlin, translate� The peace movement in the GDR (Berlin: Zeit im Bil� 1986), 5.
Imprint of University of Wisconsin Library with the date clearly marked as October 17, 1985 in
World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR: No Militarisation ofSpace! Stop the Arms Race! (Dresden:
Grafischer Grossbetrieb V0lkerfreundschaft, 1985), 1 .
93
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beliefs. "94 If the movement was truly democratic, then why were all of the
independent peace movements discussed in the previous chapter excluded and
persecuted? It also is highly irregular for a text to mention its broad-based support yet
provide no individual examples of this throughout the entire work. Each quoted
endorsement comes from a leading member of the Politburo, (primarily Erich
Honecker, leader of East Germany and a senior member of the GDR Peace Council) or
writers who strongly supported the German Democratic Republic. Where were those
members with "different philosophies and religious beliefs?"95 They could possibly
be among the faceless crowds pictured at the government sponsored peace concerts
and peace rallies. But this is unlikely since most who participated were involved in
the official Free German Youth or were party members who were expected to
participate (as discussed in the Halle example).
Why publish such a work in English unless the East German government was
in fact trying to foster a new agenda and possibly cover up abuses against truly
independent peace movement leaders in the early 1980s? The peace movement in the
GDR has a very propagandistic feel. The historical tradition and activities of the GDR

Peace Council are spelled out in terms that a middle school student could understand.
The work states that five months before the creation of the German Democratic
Republic, ''the 'German Committee of Fighters for Peace' was founded in Berlin to
later become the Peace Council of the GDR."96 If this is the case, then where was this
94
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Peace Council during the late 1970s, the early 1980s, and before, when Soviet nuclear
weapons were stationed in East Germany? The GDR Peace Council likely existed
only nominally since there is no continuous evidence of its work prior to the early
1 980s. The Council was apparently active from 1 949-1 952 since the majority of
pictures and excerpts come from this period, but the rest with two minor exceptions
come from 1 983 and later. The authors of the work even appear to have noticed the
gap because they included one sentence to try to demonstrate that the Council
continuously fought for peace. Supposedly, "Large campaigns were launched by the
GDR peace movement in the 1960s and 1 970s calling for an end to the US
intervention in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea and advocating a European security
system which was provided with an important contractual basis through the signing of
the Helsinki Final Act in 1 975."97 This statement comes on the last three pages of the
work. Even the chronology provided at the back was extremely sparse from 195 1
until 1 98 1 .98 If the Peace Council was so active, where is the evidence? There are no
pictures or documents for almost thirty years, yet there were plenty of photos and
excerpts from 1949-1 952 and the early 1 980s. The claims regarding the GDR Peace
Council as a continuous and active presence are very questionable at best. It appears
much more probable that the Peace Council was not needed by the government until
independent peace movements threatened the tight control of the German Democratic
Republic over its citizens. Increased Western media attention apparently made it
necessary for the government not only to revitalize and revamp its dormant Peace
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Council but also to write and translate propaganda for the West that demonstrated a
high level of commitment to peace throughout its history.
The evolution of the GDR peace movement's tactics, however, did not take
place overnight. Originally, many tactics from the independent peace movements
were used or indeed coopted. Such measures included writing letters to the Erich
Honecker (as Rainer Eppelmann and many others had done over the last few years).
However, one major difference in the letters from the GDR peace movement was that
they were often written by high-ranking political figures, who were in practice
Honecker's hierarchical inferiors. One example is the letter to Honecker, which the
GDR Peace Council composed at one of its meetings. 99 Writing to Honecker gave the
appearance of requesting change while actually only informing him of the measures
being taken by the Peace Council. Such actions appear to merely be propagandistic
tools since the information had probably already been discussed and approved by
Honecker prior to the GDR Peace Council meeting. In spite of this fact, the
independent peace movements had established the tactic of writing letters to top
officials appealing for transformations in the current system. By following such
methods, the German Democratic Republic could gradually absorb the cause of peace
and slowly muffle the independent peace moveiµents by taking over some of their
characteristic methods.
While writing public letters to leading East German officials was one step in
the process of superseding the independent peace movements, several other devices
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were also used. A few of these included signatures on resolutions requesting
disarmament, small meetings, and large rallies. 100 Gaining the support of certain
members of the East German Lutheran churches was another important tool. This was
still a difficult and not entirely successful task for the state. The primary obstacle in
this endeavor was the level of independence that each parish pastor had. While the
pastor should follow certain guidelines, each parish differed in the level of
participation in the independent peace movements. As discussed in the earlier case
study of Rainer Eppelmann, each parish pastor had to either have the support of the
hierarchy or take the risk of losing his parish ifhe overstepped the hierarchy's wishes.
For these and other personal reasons, many parish pastors chose not to participate in
the independent peace movements. Yet those pastors who were involved managed to
tolerate, and at times even foster, enough dissent that the state viewed them as a threat.
This led to additional force exerted not only against the dissident pastors and peace
supporters but also pressure on the higher levels of the hierarchy. It became very
important to the East German government to control as much of the Lutheran church's
top hierarchy as possible because the state believed that this would calm dissent.
By 1982, individual arrests had largely failed because of Western media
attention. 1 0 1 It had become too costly for well-known dissidents to be arrested by an
East German government that needed to maintain the levels of international support it
had. Clearly, even the Stasi was aware of this concern and took it into account. In one
100
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example in 1982, the Stasi arrested Eppelmann and about seventy of his supporters, all
of whom had signed the Berlin Appeal, which examined numerous concerns of the
independent peace movements in East Germany. 1 02 In less than a day, all had been
released. 1 03 This cooperation between the state and the Stasi seems to verify the idea
that the two organizations worked closely together even if many East German citizens
continued to believe that the Stasi followed a largely separate agenda Given the
amount of state pressure upon them, many members of the Lutheran hierarchy
acquiesced to the government's demands though they often did so with an initial
statement of criticism prior to their support of government proposals. 1 04
The German Democratic Republic's Politburo used its new Lutheran
supporters to argue that the government had always and would continue to assist the
cause of peace through the one and only official peace movement in East Germany.
An example of this is the GDR Peace Council's own description of the cooperative
work it undertook with pastors in the Federation of Evangelical Pastors of the GDR,
founded in 1958 to "mobilize pro-regime, 'progressive' pastors and pressure the
church leadership." 105 The members of the Peace Council and the pastors had ''regular
exchanges of views and ideas in a climate of trust on increased efforts in the campaign
for peace, detente and disarmament. " 106 According to the Peace Council, specific
cooperative activities included "the opening of the exhibition entitled 'Hiroshima and
Nagasaki: Warning and Obligation' on World Peace Day 1983 in Magdeburg" as well
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as ''the candid discussion held in November 1 983 in the parish of BerlinOberspree."107 The Hiroshima and Nagasaki exhibition was described by the East
German Peace Council, not by individual pastors. If there was so much collaboration
between the state and the pastors (as the text The struggle for peace, more vital than
ever claims) then why are more combined activities not listed? In the English
publications of the GDR examined for this paper, only three specific events are
discussed with reference to a combined effort by the state and a Protestant church.
East German publications stated that, "Theologians and members of all religious
communities which are active in the GDR contribute to the work of the [GDR Peace]
Council guided by their humanist and Christian beliefs." 108 Oddly, in the numerous
listings of remarks made by East German citizens in GDR Peace Council publications,
only a few Protestant pastors were quoted. One example was a pastor from Oderberg
who said, "Every true Christian must raise his voice against President Reagan's attack
missiles in Western Europe!" 1 09 Another example came from a self-professed member
of the largely artificial Christian Democrat Party in East Germany and a Protestant
Synod member who said, "Christians and non-Christians bear an equal measure of
responsibility" in relation to bringing about peace. 1 10 Both statements were clearly
political and very supportive of the German Democratic Republic's state. They
attempted to persuade the reader that these two Christians were representative of all
East German Christians in terms of their support of the state. The numerous
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independent peace movements that were aided by pastors as well as the need to
threaten many in the Lutheran church hierarchy into submission did not accord with
the perceived love of the German Democratic Republic's government. The
participation of Protestant leaders in the official East German peace movement
appears to have been sporadic at best.
In spite of this, the rhetoric in the works by the GDR Peace Council
continually tried to argue that Christians really were very active in the sole East
German peace movement. In a section entitled "In concert with Christian citizens" the
case for Christian and state cooperation is made. The Christians and the Lutheran
churches of East Germany were also said to be increasingly active in the
cause of peace and disarmament. The Federation of Protestant Churches has
vowed to live up to _its responsibility for peace with the means and possibilities
at its command. It has declared its willingness to contribute to the efforts of
our state towards a more just and peaceful world. Conscious of their shared
responsibility, many Christians, pastors and theologians have taken part in
numerous activities undertaken by the all-embracing peace movement of our
country. 1 1 1
The dismissal of the independent peace movements is clear with the statement of "the
all-embracing peace movement." The state refused to acknowledge dissent of any
kind even though many of those involved in the independent movements often began
by merely wanting an area where ideas of all types (political, economic, cultural, and
so forth) could be discussed. Instead of trying to respond to its citizens' desires, the
East German government wanted to hide all mention of this issue by reclaiming the
cause of peace and trying to make it exclusively the state's cause. The Peace
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Council's writings supported the state's plan by asserting that "The peace movement
of our country and the policies of our state draw on people from all classes and
strata." 1 12
In order to ensure that all levels of society were active in the peace movement,
the state sponsored numerous activities in the name of peace. Examples included
members of the Free German Youth (FDJ) pledging their commitment to peace at the
National Youth Festival held in 1983. 1 1 3 Other activities for youths, aptly named ''the
FDJ Mobilization for Peace campaign," were also very influential during the 1984
celebration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the German Democratic
Republic. 1 14 The FDJ demonstrated how they actively worked for peace through their
labors as industrial workers, students, scientists, and artists. 1 15 The idea of working
for peace through typical occupations is often presented in the English publications of
the GDR Peace Council. Underlying this notion is the belief that the government
supports peace, so if an East German citizen wants to work for peace, he or she can
increase their level of production at work. B�cause his or her products strengthen the
state economically, each individual worker can contribute to peace. Theoretically this
idea is possible, and the East German state could have really believed its own rhetoric.

More probable, however, is the acknowledgment that the issue of peace could be
harnessed not merely to quell internal dissent or to gain favorable international
attention but also to help save the weak economy of the German Democratic Republic.
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Eastern Bloc countries were always looking for tools to increase worker production.
The inherent problem in an economy where everyone who wants work has it, is that
there are no incentives. Why exert one's energies if job security is a guarantee? Why
work harder if there are no substantial pay increases? Since East Germany did not
have abundant wealth, incentives often came in the forms of being able to shop at
limited access stores as well as ideological attempts to increase worker production by
appealing to a particular cause.
An example of this theory in action is �e Open-Cast Mine worker, Martina
Pfefferkorn, who along with fellow workers tried to follow the '"Good Work for a
Good World "' motto. 1 1 6 Pfefferkorn explained this motto as necessary because ''the
socialist GDR is our country. We have grown up here, gone to school here, many of
us already have families, we have received new flats and we experience daily the
social achievements of real socialism." 1 17 This statement did not directly correspond
to the cause of peace, especially in relation to the themes of ending the arms race on
earth and possibly in space. Instead, Pfefferkorn appeared to be following the socialist
party line by stating how good conditions were and that the German Democratic
Republic was her home. Given the context of increased emigration permission in
1984 and continued requests to leave East Germany by many of its citizens,
Pfefferkom's statement appeared to target that problem more than the issue of
peace. 1 1 8 She focused on what the German Democratic Republic had done for her and
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how it was where she chose to live (even though it is unknown if she would have
chosen to stay if she actually had had the opportunity to freely choose). As discussed
theoretically earlier, the East German Peace Council alleged that "workers are guided
by the knowledge that the economic stability and productivity of the GDR lends
international weight to its constructive peace policies. " 1 1 9 Even with Pfefferkorn's
statements, this notion continues to appear as a weak attempt for motivating workers
to increase their productivity. While such motivations occurred as early as 1 984, few
questioned that using peace as an incentive could be a sign of economic crisis in the
country.
In addition to changes in certain workers' behavior, the German Democratic
Republic created various new events when the state chose to renew its professed
interest in peace. GDR peace movement activities ran the gamut from ''meetings,
discussions, work team gatherings, demonstrations and rallies to public readings,
poster exhibitions, solidarity b87.8al'S and discussions with scientists and cultural
workers, peace services, sporting events and rock concerts." 1 20 While the state did use
certain ideas from the independent peace movements, the Berlin Peace Run was an
event invented solely by the East German government: "The biggest running event so
far was this year's Berlin Peace Run which took place on the eve of World Peace Day
with 35,000 people taking part." 121 In one source the 1 983 Berlin Peace Run was
listed as the second time the event had been held, though the amount of German and

1 19
120

World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR, 12.
Entering the third millennium without nuclear weapons, 15, 28.
121
World Peace Day 1983 in the GDR, 19.

50
English literature on the German Democratic Republic's support of peace was not
widespread until 1983. 122
While the Berlin Peace Run was an original idea, the idea of rock concerts was
likely borrowed from the independent peace movements, possibly coming from the
successful Blues Masses held at Rainer Eppelmann' s church. Each year (beginning in
1983) the FDJ sponsored the "Political Song Festival" in which participants focused
on peace and friendship. 123 Also, the East German government funded "Rock for
Peace" concerts where the "most popular rock singers and pop groups" performed and
"donate[d] the proceeds to the peace and solidarity fund." 124 Other state...approved
activities included "Artists, actors, singers, writers and poets organiz[ing] exhibitions,
matinees, readings and performances to contribute, along with their artistic talents, to
the peace struggle and to mobilize people for action." 1 25 The independent peace
movements originally dominated similar activities, but by 1983 the German
Democratic Republic began to make very strong attempts to supersede such activities.
In many areas the state was largely successful for several reasons. First, the GDR
Peace Council could actively advertise its meetings, rallies, and similar activities in
ways the independent movements could not. Second, the state chose to mobilize all
citizens under its control to compulsory participation in the East German peace
movement. This meant that all party members, workers in government organizations,
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and youths in the Free German Youth could be quickly coerced into involvement in
the cause of peace. Clearly, their level of conviction was a separate issue.
The ability and willingness of the East German government to draw upon
members of state-sponsored organizations clearly contributed to the rapid supplanting
of the independent peace movements by the GDR Peace Council. The East German
organizations that supported the GDR Peace Cmmcil's activities included "the
Confederation of Free German Trade Unions as the biggest mass organization of the
working people, the Free German Youth organization, the Women's Democratic
League, the Sports and Gymnastics Union, the League of Culture of the GDR and
numerous professional and other associations." 1 26 These organizations were the most
important factor in the state's ability to quickly mobilize large masses for rallies,
meetings, as well as finding citizens who would verbally defend the government's
stance. According to East German sources, the Free German Youth contained "more
than 2.3 million members." 127 Turning out even a tenth of those members would
create a huge rally. The independent peace movements could not even remotely
compete with such numbers because of their lack of a central organization in addition
to their inability to spread the word about meetings and rallies because their actions

were hindered by the Stasi. While the GDR Peace Council highlighted large turnouts
for rallies, such as 300,000 at one rally, their statements were at times clearly
exaggerated. 128 One example of this embellishment was their statement that "Almost
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every citizen of the GDR participates, in one way or another, in the pluriform
activities of the GDR's peace movement." 1 29 While the state did control a number of
people, it did not have total power over them. If it had, the rally of 300,000 would
have instead been a million or more people. This type of overstatement reinforces the
idea that the English-translated GDR Peace Council's texts were tools that the
government used to try to bolster its own image of East Germany.
In spite of such embellishments, the East German Peace Council at times
seemed to realize that it did not control everyone. This understanding was made clear
in a statement:
The GDR Peace Council is not a rigid body with a strict organization. It offers
ample opportunities to everybody who wishes to cooperate constructively with
the Council in the cause of peace. Therefore, there are no 'membership
quotas' fixed for certain population groups and there is not even any formal
membership required for participation in th� struggle against nuclear war and
the arms race. In this way, the Peace Council and in general the peace
movement provide vast opportunities and scope to all members of society,
irrespective of their social, political and philosophical stance, to work for their
one common goal. 130
These apparent contradictions that exist only sixteen pages apart could have occurred
for many reasons. Multiple authors may not have examined previous texts. Or one
author or one group of authors could have written both statements. While one or two
authors writing a text with clear contradictions may seem impossible, almost every
East German citizen thought in terms of several layers of facts and opinions. An
example of this is that only those people who actually participated in official peace
movement activities would know for certain of their participation. Yet even those
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who did not attend the officially sponsored events would likely say, if questioned by
his employer, members of the government, or identified Stasi agents, that he attended.
Even if the state knew the non-attender was lying, they would probably still include
him in the numbers of attendees because he said that he was there. These
contradictions aside, the German Democratic Republic did actively decide to work
toward its own understanding of "peace" with renewed interest from 1 983 until 1 986.
This desire is succinctly stated in a work about the 1 983 World Peace Day: "Peace is
the supreme imperative for us, for the policies of our Party and government.
Socialism decrees this by its very nature. It has already been said here that another
war must never emanate from German soil. That has always been our pledge, ever
since the GDR was founded, and we shall stand by it, now and for all time." 1 3 1 As the
next chapter explains, East Germany's leaders may not have always practiced such
peaceful ideas with their actions, but the emphasis on "now" appears to demonstrate
the state's new effort in this area even if it took independent peace movements to spur
the government into action.

131

World Peace Day 1983 in the GDR, 12.

.----------------------------------11111111·-------�
55
Chapter 4
The Roller Coaster That was Detente: Ostpolitik and the Early 1980s Arms Race
The year 1983 was a turning point for the antinuclear peace movements in East
Germany. There were several reasons for this. Throughout 1983 the German
Democratic Republic's state worked to gain control over the independent peace
movements throughout the country. The GDR Peace Council was largely successful
in its efforts, though the timing of key decisions in the politics surrounding the nuclear
question also played a role in the Council's accomplishments. By 1984 the
antinuclear movement had become in effect a non-issue. This was because the
euromissiles debate, which had specific implications for the two Germanies, ended
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in November 1983 when the United States
deployed Pershing II missiles in West Germany. However, the GDR Peace Council
continued to use the issue to ensure that independent peace movements did not
reemerge. The GDR Peace Council also tried to find common ground and lessen
tensions between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany because the
GDR was allied with the Soviet Union but the Federal Republic was one of it main
trading partners. East German leaders wanted a new type of detente because West
Germany provided economic benefits that the German Democratic Republic
desperately needed at this time. Additionally, the Soviet Union was East Germany's
diplomatic and ideological ally. Relations between the two German states had reached
a form of rapprochement under the previous West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt.
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His foreign policy in 1972 toward the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet
Union was known as Ostpolitik.
Brandt believed that greater cooperation could exist between the two
Germanies if diplomatic coexistence became the established policy. This course of
action "belatedly recognized Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe" and propelled West
· Germany into a higher status in international affairs. 1 32 Brandt believed that detente
was possible, and he led the Federal Republic's efforts toward this goal.
In the early 1970s, Brandt created the primary arguments in favor of
Ostpolitik. He believed th�t realism and communication should be the basis for all
politics between the East and West. Brandt argued that ''the realities of the postwar
settlement should be accepted." 133 He also favored increased communication between
Eastern and Western powers because he believed that this could lead to the saturation
of Western ideas into the communist East, which would lead to gradual changes.
Brandt also believed that the West's security interests must be acknowledged in
relation to the East's interests if ''the realities of power politics" were going to change.
Brandt believed that recognizing the current state of affairs was the first step to
transforming East-West relations. Part of acknowledging the status quo was to
reassure the Soviet Union that it was the predominant force in Eastern Europe. Brandt
thought that Moscow would be more willing to communicate with the West if Soviet
leaders were not constantly fearful about being forced out of East Germany and then
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out of Eastern Europe. Ostpolitik also led to the acknowledgement that ''the division
of Germany would last as long as the division ofEurope." 1 34 Finally, Brandt believed
that the Federal Republic should be treated as an adult within the Western community
because it had been integrated into the West and it should now be able to "' look after
its [own] interests with respect to the East in a more vigorous way."' 1 3 5
It is within this context of Ostpolitik that relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic progressed from the early
1970s until the late 1970s when the question of intermediate-range missiles came to
the forefront in East-West relations. This issue arose in earnest in October 1 979 when
Brezhnev, at a meeting in East Berlin, "made a much-publicized offer to reduce the
nwnber of his country's intermediate-range missiles provided that the West abandoned
all consideration of its own INF deployments." 1 �6 The German Democratic Republic
also supported this proposal. This is evident from a letter written by Erich Honecker,
the leader of East Germany, on October 12, 1 979, to Helmut Schmidt, the current
Social Democrat Chancellor of West Germany. In the letter Honecker "emphasized
that any NATO decision to station the INF forces on German soil would 'necessarily
have negative consequences for relations between the GDR and the FRG. "' 1 3 7

Honecker's support may have been an act of conforming to expected behavior for a
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country in the Soviet Bloc. But it is more likely that Honecker also worried about
having additional Soviet nuclear missiles deployed in East Germany because more
missiles would make the GDR an even greater target if the West decided upon a
nuclear attack. The Soviet Union's leadership told Honecker that ifNATO chose to
deploy missiles, the exact number deployed in West Germany would be stationed by
the Soviet Union in East Germany. 1 3 8 Leaders in the German Democratic Republic
"chose to underscore their regret at the extent to which the 'so hopeful' developments
between the German[ies] had been threatened by international tensions." 1 39 This tame
language was very different from the harsh words that Moscow had for the West
German government's role in the intermediate nuclear missiles debate. 140 In spite of
this, Schmidt tried to stave off the end of detente. 141 President Jimmy Carter of the
United States knew that the issue of nuclear missiles in West Germany could be a
divisive issue, not only between the two superpowers but also between the Federal
Republic and the United States. 142 This awareness did not help to defuse the issue.
By the early 1 980s there was a clear rift between the United States and the Soviet
Union over the number of missiles that could remain deployed in the two Germanies.
The issue of nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic and in the German
Democratic Republic became even more important when President Ronald Reagan
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proposed the "zero option" on November 18, 1981. 143 The "zero option" stated that
"If the Soviet Union would agree to dismantle its SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s, NATO
would cancel deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles." 144 The Soviet Union
flatly rejected the plan arguing that it was ''pure propaganda" based on "absolutely
fantastic facts." 145 The primary problem was over the definition of what constituted
an equal number of intermediate range missiles in Europe and the boundaries of
Europe. The Soviet Union believed that British and French weapons should be
included in the total number allowed in Europe for the West. 146 The United States
disagreed with this definition because nuclear missiles inside the Soviet Union itself
were excluded since leaders in Moscow said they were not technically in Europe. In
1978, the Soviet Union had deployed fifty SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. By the
end of 1981, two hundred fifty SS-20s were present in countries belonging to the
Soviet Bloc. 147 The West had not sent any new missiles during this time period. 148
Given these new additions in the East, the two superpowers did not have equal
numbers of missiles in Europe. After the Soviet Union had fortified its East European
arsenal, Brezhnev decided on March 16, 1982, to declare a moratorium on stationing
new intermediate· missiles in Europe. 149 In response to Brezhnev's action, "In
Washington, President Reagan said that the moratorium proposal did not go far
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enough and that it would leave a large Soviet arsenal intact." 150 Prior to these
negotiations, many other options had been explored and dismissed, primarily by the
Soviets.
One well-publicized example was the so-called "walk in the woods
agreement," which occurred in the summer of 1982. 1 5 1 This particular arrangement
occurred between the United States Ambassador Paul Nitze and the Soviet Union's
negotiator, Juri Kvitsinsky. 1 52 The two men decided to present to their respective
governments a package which stated that "the United States and the USSR would each
have 225 long-range intermediate nuclear force (LRINF) missile launchers and aircraft
in Europe; each would be limited to a ceiling of 75 LRINF missile launchers in
Europe." 1 53 Further conditions were that the United States could only deploy cruise
missiles while the Soviet Union could simply send ballistic missiles. 1 54 There were
additional limitations on the numbers of missile launchers that the Soviet Union could
have in its eastern regions as well as limits on numbers of American and Soviet
aircraft that could be present at a given time. 1 55 The Soviet Union rejected the
agreement. Instead Moscow demanded "no U.S. deployments, no constraints on
Soviet deployments in the Eastern USSR, radical reductions in dual-capability aircraft,
and full adherence to the principle of equality and parity." 1 56 These were demands
that the United States could not agree to follow.
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The unacceptable proposals continued back and forth from both sides, as each
said that the other was trying to gain superiority over the world. 157 Meanwhile, a
political change occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1983 election.
According to Jeffrey Herf, "The election of March 6 was a turning point in postwar
history and a continuation of the reversal in the regional balance of forces in Europe
that Helmut Schmidt had set in motion in October 1 977." 158 Helmut Kohl, leader of
the Christian Democrat Union, or CDU, became the new Chancellor of the Federal
Republic. Kohl had campaigned in support of the United States deployments and a
stronger alliance between the United States and West Germany. 159 By contrast, the
Social Democrats were clear in their desire to stop the planned missile deployment. 160
West German voters had decided in favor of the leader and the party who urged for the
acceptance of the missiles.
While new leadership took over in the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Soviet Union took advantage of the situation and "By March 1 983, the Soviets had
deployed 35 1 SS-20s, with 1 053 warheads, and no new American missiles had
arrived." 161 Another series of proposals ensued, were rejected by either side, and the
Soviet Union continued to insist that equal numbers of missiles must include those of

Great Britain and France. 162 At the same time that the negotiations continued, the
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Social Democrats debated how they would vote on the euromissile question at a
meeting in Cologne. While former Chancellor Schmidt wanted to blame the Soviet
Union for the East-West conflict, the overwhelming majority of the other delegates
decided to vote against the deployment of new American missiles in the Federal
Republic.1 63 The final vote was held in the Bundestag on November 22, 1983. 1 64 In
this vote, "All 286 members of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition voted in favor of the
resolution, while 226 Social Democrats and Green members voted against it."165
Arrivals of the Pershing Ils began the next weekend. 1 66
Once this occurred amidst the crisis, the German Democratic Republic started
actively seeking to preserve its ties, especially for economic reasons, to the Federal
Republic of Germany. 1 67 East Germany tried to "downplay the significance of the
deployment" while the Soviet Union tried to penalize West Germany. 168 At other
times the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union had not been on the
same page even during the euromissiles controversy. While both countries believed
that the level of security needed to increase along the East European border, their
reasons for this varied. 169 The Soviets desired greater security in this area because it
"worried in particular about both Chinese militarism and the potential that the FRO
would gain nuclear capabilities of its own." 1 70 East German leaders wanted a more
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secure and static region because they were concerned about "protection against the
flow of human beings-either a flow of West Germans into the GDR, thanks to
improved transit and visitation rights; or a flow of East German out of the GDR, via
cooperation with all those new capitalist visitors." 17 1 While both had the same goal,
their justifications were quite different. This example demonstrates the existence of a
divergence of ideas over how the German Democratic Republic should be run between
the leaders of the Soviet Union and those of East Germany. These divisions increased
for a brief period in 1983 and 1984 before the Soviet Union ended such blatantly
independent foreign policy gestures by the GDR toward the Federal Republic.
While these actions were wildly outside the norm for a country within the
Soviet Bloc, the German Democratic Republic likely felt an attempt to salvage ties to
West Germany was vitally necessary and justified given the GDR's declining
economy. Surprisingly, "Economic links between both German states flourished
during the early 1980s, most dramatically with Bonn's two DM 1 billion credits to
East Berlin in 1983-1984." 172 Political and diplomatic issues, such as a combined
Germany or a renewal of German national unity, were pragmatically dismissed by
West Gennany and East Germany. 1 73 Instead, the two countries focused on "their
joint commitment to the preservation of peace and cooperation in Europe." 174 While
the Soviet Union initially tolerated this type of behavior by the German Democratic
Republic, its patience finally ended when Honecker planned to visit the Federal

171

East Germany, Detente, and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973, 169.
The German Problem Transformed, 1 89.
173
The German Problem Transformed, 1 89.
174
The German Problem Transformed, 1 89.

172

64
Republic in September 1984. 1 75 Honecker's trip was "postponed" with no further
explanation. 1 76 The visit' s goal was to have been ''to signal mutual German
determination to construct an island of detente in Central Europe, a 'coalition of
reason' in an implied sea of irrationality." 177 Instead, in October 1984, Gromyko, then
the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, rebuked the East German leadership's
separate policies. In the keynote address for the October Revolution's anniversary,
Gromyko ''warned 'revanchists' (the West Germans) and 'semi-revanchists' (the East
Germans) 'of all stripes, wherever they are' (in either Bonn or East Berlin) that 'the
German Reich (not just Hitler's Third Reich, but any hope for a unified German state)
burned to the ground in the fire of the Second World War. There is no return to it, nor
will there be."' 1 78 Such language left nothing to the imagination. The Soviet Union
had clearly had enough of even mildly independent East German foreign policies. The
euromissiles controversy brought to the surface some budding issues of conflict
between the leaders in East Berlin and Moscow, but by the end of 1984, these had
died. 1 79
Before the October 1984 speech by Gromyko, the German Democratic
Republic had tried to accommodate its Soviet allies while also trying to maintain
economic support from the Federal Republic. East Germany's support for the Soviet
Union took various forms. One example is that in 1983 and after, the German
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Democratic Republic's government began to praise peace and the actions taken by the
Soviet Union to create peace. While these statements might technically have been true
if they were published in December 1983, they would not have been valid prior to that
time. The GDR Peace Council literature discussed in the previous chapter continually
blamed Western powers for the lack of peace. Yet from 1979 until November 1983,
the West tried to reach peaceful solutions. Only after all these attempts had failed, the
United States deployed Pershing II missiles with authorization from the Federal
Republic of Germany.
As this chapter has discussed, this event provided a short-lived turning point
for the German Democratic Republic. For much of 1984, East German leaders
followed their own foreign policy, diverging from the Soviet line in some areas. After
Gromyko's speech stopped this type of action immediately, it took the appointment of
a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1985 before the two countries began to
closely plan their foreign trade again. 180 Shortly after Gorbachev took the top office,
he decided to reopen the intermediate nuclear force (INF) negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union. 181 In spite of the East German leadership's 1984
rebuke by the Soviet Union, "policymakers in the GDR and the FRG were already
prepared to enter into a qualitatively new stage in their relations" before the new INF
meetings began. 182 To maintain the economic benefits of the relationship, leaders of
the German Democratic Republic understood that certain accommodations had to be
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made to ensure Bonn's goodwill. 183 At the same time, East German leadership
worked to remain within the lines of acceptable foreign policy that were drawn so
firmly by the Soviet Union. Concurrently, changes within East Germany, and the
ongoing development of the actors of the independent peace movements, would now
become a factor.

183

Germany Divided, 165.

67
Chapter 5
The Pockets of Resistance Become One Mass Movement

The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union in
1985 ushered in a new era of changes, the significance of which can still be seen
today, though other transformations were tal<lng place even before then: "The Charter
77 movement in Czechoslovakia, the Polish Solidarnosc (Solidarity) union, and the
German peace movement[s] fought not just for the recovery of civil rights but also for
the construction of a new form of civic self-organization." 1 84 Prior to these events, the
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 led many East Germans to feel trapped while
the Prague Spring of 1968 provided a brief flicker of hope that the system could
change before Soviet tanks rolled in to snuff it out. This long series of events on the
international stage, in addition to a stagnating economy, loss of faith in the state's
ability to effectively govern, and gradual erosion of control by the Soviet Union led to
the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989.
However, one thing is clear: the events of 1989 would have been impossible if
the framework for dissent in the German Democratic Republic had not been
previously established. The leaders of the independent peace movements were the
groundbreakers who accomplished this great feat. Leaders such as Eppelmann,
Eigenfeld, and Wollenberger wrote letters, organized marches, led small meetings and
larger rallies, and learned how to utilize the Western media to further their causes. In
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doing so, they learned how to mobilize people, build coalitions, all the basics of
leadership, and the political strategies for targeting the concerns and ideas of their
fellow citizens. They also discovered that it was possible to oppose the state and
survive, though arrests and torture were likely to be the penalty for such behavior. In
spite of this, they refused to let such obstacles stand in their way.
Eppelmann and Eigenfeld, already discussed in detail above, were chosen for
case studies because each had different motivations for participation in the
independent peace movements. Also, each became a leader or co-founder of groups
that made 1989 a historical turning point. Eppelmann was a founding member of
Democratic Awakening, which was "the only large opposition group that made initial
references to a 'reform of socialism."' 1 85 For his part, Eigenfeld helped to create New
Forum, formed by people from various cities who wrote and disseminated copies of
the New Forum appeal, which stated that they ''wanted to address all those who
wanted to stay, all those who wanted to fight for a transformation of the existing
society," rather than simply emigrating to West Germany. 1 86 This call for reform was
typical among leaders of the independent peace movements of the early 1980s. While
some of the members wanted to leave East Germany, these leaders chose to stay to
fight for reform.
By contrast, the case of Vera Wollenberger, "one of the founders of the
antiestablishment 'church from below,"' is significantly different. 1 87 She and many
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other well-known critics were expelled from the German Democratic Republic at the
beginning of 1 988. 1 88 Such measures were taken by the state in order to "quell
discontent among its artistic community and churches. " 1 89 Prior to her expulsion to
the Federal Republic of Germany, Wollenberger participated in the independent peace
movements of the early 1 980s as well as being involved in a nongovernmental
women's group, which formed out of a larger independent peace movement group,
demonstrating "growing opposition to the ruling power structures" in the early
1 980s. 190 She continued to work in and lead similar organizations until 1 988. The
work of Wollenberger and other women like her increasingly provided East German
women with their own voice regarding their fears and concerns as well as the hopes
for change that they shared with the other members of the group.
Beyond each of these brief case studies of leadership figures, there are
hundreds of others who also led the oppositional movements as well as the thousands
who participated in these activities. Any of them could have been chosen as a case
study and though their stories would be different, the overarching theme of civic
participation to create change would be pervasive. Eppelmann, Eigenfeld, and
Wollenberger were chosen because of their early and later leadership roles as well as
the availability of resources that provided for a more in-depth analysis of their reasons
for participation and the methods they used. While each of these leaders was
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important in the creation of opposition to the state, one event was a necessary
precursor to the independent peace movements: the INF debate.
The role of the intermediate nuclear force controversy was an important and
yet unlikely link in the chain of events leading to a mass movement from below in the
German Democratic Republic. Without the INF debate of 1979 until 1983, the
independent peace movements would not have had a single issue to rally behind. The
desire for peace and an end to nuclear weapons in East Germany led a variety of
different individuals to join an oppositional group and become involved. The agendas
of these groups spread beyond the urgent cause of peace. They became places in
which the attendees had a voice. Their remarks did not follow the party line, and for
many this was the first time they had shared such ideas with anyone outside of their
immediate family. The psychological effects of such acts were significant. While the
independent peace movements existed in many forms, the most common was a small
group where such personal contact and empowerment was maximized. Examples of
the small groups were the women's groups that Vera Wollenberger participated in as
well as the slightly larger though still relatively small group originally organized and
led by Ruth Misselwitz which Wollenberger also attended. Another example was the
small group, which first focused on peace and later on the environment, that Frank
Eigenfeld organized, participated in, and led. Together the groups provided small
pockets of dissent throughout East Germany.
After the INF controversy had been settled, the state took over the issue of
peace and formed the GDR Peace Council in an effort to calm dissent. While the state
was largely successful in making the cause of peace its own on a rhetorical level, other
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concerns, such as human rights and the environment, took the place of peace for
dissenting groups. Small groups formed around these causes, and opposition from
below continued throughout the 1 980s. Unfortunately this time period has been
largely ignored in the historiography. Many historians have chosen to focus on the
larger, denser opposition activities in 1 988 and 1 989. These events are also very
important, but it is unlikely that they would have been so effective in such a short
period of time if the tools learned and applied to later movements by the leaders of the
independent peace movements, had only been taken up in 1 988 and 1989.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The independent peace movements that appeared from 1979-1983 in the
German Democratic Republic provided the necessary skills and mindset for the later
successful opposition movements of 1989. In particular, the case studies of
Eppelmann and Eigenfeld demonstrated that the movements taught them how to
organize and mobilize people toward a specific cause. Meanwhile, the case study of
Wollenberger showed that many East German citizens even in the early 1980s did not
know how to lead small groups or how to voice their opinions in public, but
Wollenberger also proved that these skills could be learned. All three case studies
established that citizens did not always agree with the state's actions, but until the
independent peace movements provided a foundation or possibility for doing so, many
had no idea how they could effectively voice their dissent.
The creation of the independent peace movements, while furnishing a forum
for discussion about political and social issues, also slowly created a greater level of
"free space" within the Lutheran churches. This was not universally true, but many
more churches opened their doors to opposition groups from 1979 on. There are
numerous levels on which this was an important development. Lutheran churches
often had to defend the independent peace movements against the government. By
doing this, certain Lutheran churches, intentionally in some cases and unintentionally
in others, became sites where dissent against the government was tolerated, at least in
relative terms. The independent peace movements pushed this "free space" at times,
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but they also made many churches aware that citizens had numerous ideas that could
not be voiced anywhere else. This new consciousness because of the actions of the
independent peace movements meant that when issues about the environment, human
rights, and other problems were raised in the mid-to-late 1980s, more and more
Lutheran churches contributed space for oppositionists. This became very important
in 1988 and 1989 because without these locations, which were relatively protected
from the Stasi, it is unlikely that the "revolution" of 1989 would have been cohesive
enough to succeed. The independent peace movements forced Lutheran churches'
hands, and some of the churches responded with meeting space, which set a new
precedent.
While the independent peace movements were important in this way, they
were not entirely protected from harassment and arrests, as previously discussed. The
movements were also just that: plural entities and not one united effort. For this
reason, the German Democratic Republic was able to supersede the independent
groups and create the official, government-sanctioned East German peace movement.
This movement did not have to worry about the Stasi because it was state sponsored
and organized. The East German peace movement was successful because members
of the socialist party and trade unions all participated in marches, rallies, and letter
writing. The united movement spoke often about peace and linked it to the German
Democratic Republic and its public relations initiatives, yet very little was really done
to create peace. Instead, the East German peace movement was an effective tool for
quickly quieting true dissent over a debatable topic.
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The issue of peace was quite controversial in the early 1980s because of the
INF debate, in which the United States and the Soviet Union argued over the number
of intermediate nuclear weapons that could be deployed in the two Germanies. After a
decision had been reached in 1983, the anti-nuclear argument, which was inherently
linked to the independent peace movements, temporarily became a non-issue. Most of
those involved in these movements moved to the issues of greater human rights and a
cleaner environment. In spite of this, the official East German peace movement
ensured that peace would not continue as a focal point for dissent. This was an
important development for the government because while the state often said it
believed in creating peace, it did very little to achieve this. In fact, the positioning of
intermediate range nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union was contrary to the idea of
peace and demonstrated a blatant contradiction in the GDR's policies, which strongly
advocated world-wide peace.
While the official East German peace movement was successful in turning
peace into a state-controlled cause, the government was less effective in actually
ending dissent by its citizens, which demonstrated the increasing space for dissent
which the independent peace movements had created. The independent peace
movements demonstrated that opposition existed, that some Lutheran churches would
provide meeting space for these dissenters, and that many believed change might
actually come if the citizens were able to convince the government of other ideas. The
independent groups also gave many a voice as well as leadership and organizational
skills that they would not have acquired otherwise. Most of these participants were
unwilling to give up their new voice, and those who found the courage to lead also
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refused to let go of this new, important tool in their fight to change the system. The
"bloodless revolution" would probably have taken place without the independent
peace movements, but it is likely that the year would not have been 1989 but much
later.
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